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Abstract. Task models produced from task analysis, are a very important element 
of UCD approaches as they provide support for describing users goals and users 
activities, allowing human factors specialists to ensure and assess the effective-
ness of interactive applications. As user errors are not part of a user goal they are 
usually omitted from tasks descriptions. However, in the field of Human Relia-
bility Assessment, task descriptions (including task models) are central artefacts 
for the analysis of human errors. Several methods (such as HET, CREAM and 
HERT) require task models in order to systematically analyze all the potential 
errors and deviations that may occur. However, during this systematic analysis, 
potential human errors are gathered and recorded separately and not connected 
to the task models. Such non integration brings issues such as completeness (i.e. 
ensuring that all the potential human errors have been identified) or combined 
errors identification (i.e. identifying deviations resulting from a combination of 
errors). We argue that representing human errors explicitly and systematically 
within task models contributes to the design and evaluation of error-tolerant in-
teractive system. However, as demonstrated in the paper, existing task modeling 
notations, even those used in the methods mentioned above, do not have a suffi-
cient expressive power to allow systematic and precise description of potential 
human errors. Based on the analysis of existing human error classifications, we 
propose several extensions to existing task modelling techniques to represent ex-
plicitly all the types of human error and to support their systematic task-based 
identification. These extensions are integrated within the tool-supported notation 
called HAMSTERS and are illustrated on a case study from the avionics domain. 
1 Introduction 
Task analysis and modelling approaches have always focused on the explicit repre-
sentation of standard behavior of users, leaving user error analysis for later phases in 
the design processes [2]. This is part of the rationale underlying task analysis which is 
to provide an exhaustive analysis of user behavior describing goals and activities to 
reach these goals. Clearly, errors, mistakes and deviations are not part of the users’ 
goals and thus left aside of tasks descriptions. This exhaustive aspect of task analysis 
is fundamental as it is meant to provide the basics for a global understanding of users 
behaviors which will serve as a basis for driving evolutions of the interactive system. 
However, practice (for real-life applications) shows that reaching this comprehensive-
ness is very hard, especially as it require a vast amount of resources. If cuts have to be 
made when analyzing standard activities, it is clear that infrequent or abnormal behav-
iors are often not considered. However, this is precisely where the emphasis should be 
placed in order to deal efficiently with error tolerance as error prone systems deeply 
impact efficiency and satisfaction. Beyond these usability-related aspects, in critical 
systems the cost of an operator error might put people life at stake, and this is the reason 
why Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) methods (such as HET, CREAM or HERT) 
provide means for identifying human errors. Such approaches go beyond early work of 
Norman on typologies of human errors [23] which have then been integrated in the 
action theory [24]. Indeed, they are usually associated with tasks descriptions in order 
to relate work and goals with erroneous behaviors of operators. However, they all ex-
ploits basic task description techniques making impossible to go beyond qualitative and 
quantitative temporal descriptions.  
In this paper we propose the use of a detailed task description technique called 
HAMSTERS [21] within a HRA method to support identification of errors related to 
information, knowledge and devices. Beyond that, we present extensions to 
HAMSTERS notation in order to describe identified error within the task models. Inte-
grating errors within a task model brings multiple advantages, the most prominent being 
the seamless representation of activities to reach goals and possible deviations. Such 
integrated representation can be exploited for building effective and error avoidant in-
teractive systems. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the human error domain, hu-
man reliability assessment methods and task modeling. This state of the art is used to 
identify limitations of current HRA methods and to identify requirements for extending 
task models to encompass information dedicated to user errors. Section 3 presents an 
extended version of the HAMSTERS notation in which genotypes and phenotypes of 
errors enrich “standard” task models. This section also proposes a stepwise process 
based on Human Error Template (HET) [36] HRA method to systematically identify 
user errors and to represent them in task models. Section 4 shows, on a case study, how 
this framework can be used and what it brings to the design and verification of error-
tolerant safety critical interactive systems. Section 5 highlights benefits and limitations 
of the approach while section 6 concludes the paper and presents future work. 
2 Related Work on Human Error and Task Modelling 
Human error has received a lot of attention over the years and this section aims at pre-
senting the main concepts related to human errors as well as the existing approaches 
for analyzing them. This related work section starts with the analysis of taxonomies of 
human errors followed by processes and methods for identifying human errors in 
socio-technical systems. Last sub-section summarizes work on representing human 
errors with a specific focus on representations based on task description.  
2.1 Definition and taxonomies of human errors 
Several contributions in the human factors domain deal with studying internal human 
processes that may lead to actions that can be perceived as erroneous from an external 
view point. In the 1970s, Norman, Rasmussen and Reason have proposed theoretical 
frameworks to analyze human error. Norman, proposed a predictive model for errors 
[23], where the concept of "slip" is highlighted and causes of error are rooted in im-
proper activation of patterns of action. Rasmussen proposes a model of human perfor-
mance which distinguishes three levels: skills, rules and knowledge (SRK model) [31]. 
This model provides support for reasoning about possible human errors and has been 
used to classify error types. Reason [33] takes advantages of the contributions of Nor-
man and Rasmussen, and distinguishes three main categories of errors: 
1. Skill-based errors are related to the skill level of performance in SRK. These errors 
can be of one of the 2 following types: a) Slip, or routine error, which is defined as 
a mismatch between an intention and an action [23]; b) Lapse which is defined as a 
memory failure that prevents from executing an intended action. 
2. Rule-based mistakes are related to the rule level of performance in SRK and are 
defined as the application of an inappropriate rule or procedure. 
3. Knowledge-based errors are related to the knowledge level in SRK and are defined 
as an inappropriate usage of knowledge, or a lack of knowledge or corrupted 
knowledge preventing from correctly executing a task. 
At the same time, Reason proposed a model of human performance called GEMS 
[33] (Generic Error Modelling System), which is also based on the SRK model and 
dedicated to the representation of human error mechanisms. GEMS is a conceptual 
framework that embeds a detailed description of the potential causes for each error 
types above. These causes are related to various models of human performance. For 
example, a perceptual confusion error in GEMS is related to the perceptual processor 
of the Human Processor model [5]. GEMS is very detailed in terms of description and 
vocabulary (e.g. strong habit intrusion, capture errors, overshooting a stop rule …) and 
structuring approaches have been proposed as the Human Error Reference Table 
(HERT) in [25].  
Causes of errors and their observation are different concepts that should be separated 
when analyzing user errors. To do so, Hollnagel [9] proposed a terminology based on 
2 main concepts: phenotype and genotype. The phenotype of an error is defined as the 
erroneous action that can be observed. The genotype of the error is defined as the char-
acteristics of the operator that may contribute to the occurrence of an erroneous action.  
These concepts and the classifications above provide support for reasoning about 
human errors and have been widely used to develop approaches to design and evaluate 
interactive systems [34]. As pointed out in [26] investigating the association between a 
phenotype and its potential genotypes is very difficult but is an important step in order 
to assess the error-proneness of an interactive system. This is why most of the ap-
proaches for Human Reliability Assessment focus on this double objective, as pre-
sented in next section.  
2.2 Techniques and methods for identifying Human Errors 
Many techniques have been proposed for identifying which human errors may occur in 
a particular context and what could be their consequences in this given context. Several 
human reliability assessment techniques such as CREAM [10], HEART [44], and 
THERP [39] are based on task analysis. They provide support to assess the possibility 
of occurrence of human errors by structuring the analysis around task descriptions. Be-
yond these commonalities, THERP technique provides support for assessing the prob-
ability of occurrence of human errors. Table 1 presents an overview on the existing 
techniques for identifying potential human errors. For each technique, the following 
information is highlighted: 
· Type of technique: to indicate to which scientific domain this technique is related. 
Values can be HEI (Human Error Identification), DC (Dependable Computing), 
SA (Safety Analysis) … 
· Associated task modelling technique: to indicate how the user tasks are described 
once the task analysis has been performed. Most of them exploit HTA (Hierar-
chical Task Analysis notation) [1]; 
Table 1. Summary of techniques and methods used for identifying human errors 
Name of the technique Type of 
tech-
nique 
Task 
model-
ling 
Tool 
sup-
port  
Associated error classification (Ge-
neric/Specific) 
Combi-
nation of 
errors 
Hazard and operability study 
(HAZOP) [15] 
Safety 
analysis 
HTA None Not done, Less, More, As well as, Other 
than, Repeated, Sooner, Later, Misor-
dered, Part of 
G NE 
Systematic human error re-
duction and prediction ap-
proach (SHERPA) [7] 
HEI, 
HRA 
HTA None Action errors, Checking errors, Commu-
nication errors, Info retrieval errors, Se-
lection errors 
S No 
Potential human error cause 
analysis (PHECA) [43] 
HEI, 
HRA 
HTA None HAZOP classification G NE 
Cognitive reliability and er-
ror analysis method 
(CREAM) [10] 
HEI, 
HRA 
HTA None Timing, Duration, Sequence, Object, 
Force, Direction, Distance, Speed 
S NE 
Human error assessment and 
reduction technique 
(HEART) [44] 
HEI, 
HRA 
HTA None None (concrete description of the human 
error) 
S NE 
Human Error Identification 
In Systems Tool (HEIST) 
[13] 
HEI, 
HRA 
HTA None Skill Rule Knowledge model S NE 
Human Error Template 
(HET) [36] 
HEI, Hu-
man Fac-
tors 
HTA None Fail to execute: Task execution incom-
plete, Task executed in the wrong direc-
tion, Wrong task executed, Task re-
peated, Task executed on the wrong in-
terface element,  
Task executed : too early/too late/too 
much/too little, Misread information, 
other 
S No 
System for Predictive Error 
Analysis and Reduction 
(SPEAR) [40] 
HEI, 
HRA, SA 
HTA None Action, Retrieval, Check, Selection, 
Transmission 
G No 
Task Analysis For Error 
Identification (TAFEI) [2] 
HEI, HF HTA None Generic categories S NE 
Technique for Human Error 
Assessment (THEA) [30] 
HEI, HCI HTA None Goals, Plans, Performing actions, Per-
ception, Interpretation and evaluation 
S NE 
Human Error Recovery and 
Assessment (HERA) [14] 
HEI 
HRA 
HTA None Omission, Timing, Sequence, Quality, 
Selection error, Information Transmis-
sion error, Rule Violation, Other 
S No 
Tech. for Human Error Pre-
cision Rate (THERP) [39] 
HRA Not 
speci-
fied. 
None Omission, Commission, Selection error, 
Error of sequence, Time error, Qualita-
tive error. 
S No 
Tech. for the Retrospective 
and Predictive Analysis of 
Cognitive Errors in Air Traf-
fic Control (TRACer) [35] 
HEI 
HRA 
HTA None Selection and Quality 
Timing and Sequence 
Communication 
S No 
Task Model-Based System-
atic Analysis of System Fail-
ures and Human Errors [20] 
HCI, DC HAMST
ERS 
HAM
STER
S 
HAZOP and Reason classifications G NE 
· Tool support for task analysis and modelling: to indicate whether or not a particular 
Computer Aided Software Environment (CASE) tool is available to provide sup-
port for the application of the technique; 
· Associated error classification: to indicate which human error classification is used 
to identify possible errors. ‘G’ and ‘S’ indicates whether the classification comes 
from a generic system failures analysis or whether it is specific to human errors; 
· Capacity to deal with combination of errors: to indicate whether or not the tech-
niques provides explicit support for identifying possible combinations of errors. 
Here only 2 values are possible: ‘No’ and ‘NE’ (Not Explicitly meaning that the 
method was not claiming explicitly that combinations of errors are handled). 
For all the techniques presented above the process of identifying possible human 
errors highly relies on the user tasks descriptions. The task descriptions have to be pre-
cise, complete and representative of the user activities, in order to be able to identify all 
the possible errors. Indeed, the task description language as well as the mean to produce 
the description affect the quality of the analysis. However, most of them exploit Hier-
archical Task Analysis (HTA) which only provides support for decomposing user goals 
into tasks and subtasks and for describing the sequential relationships between these 
tasks (in a separate textual representation called “plan”). As HTA does not provide 
support for describing precisely the types of user actions, the temporal ordering types 
that are different from a sequence of actions (such as concurrent actions, order inde-
pendent actions…), as well as information and knowledge required to perform an ac-
tion, errors related to these elements cannot be identified. Furthermore, as most of these 
techniques do not have tool support it is cumbersome to check coverage of and to store 
identified errors in a systematic way. For example, as HTA does not provide support 
for describing knowledge required to perform a task, none of these methods provide 
explicit support for the identification of all possible knowledge-based mistakes. 
2.3 Support for representation of human errors in task model 
As explained above the expressive power of the task modelling notation has a direct 
impact on how task models produced with these notation are likely to support the iden-
tification of errors. Many task modelling notations have been proposed over the years 
focusing on the representation of standard user behaviors most of the time leaving aside 
erroneous behaviors.  
Table 2 presents a comparison of task modelling notations to assess (depending on 
their expressive power) their capability in identifying and representing human errors. 
For each notation, the following information is highlighted: 
· Identification of human error: to indicate whether or not the notation provides 
support to systematically establish a relationship between a task model element 
and a component of a model of human information processing or model of hu-
man performance. 
· Explicit representation of human error: to indicate whether or not the notation 
provides support to systematically represent human error related information in 
a task model. 
· Explicit representation of error recovery: to indicate whether or not the notation 
provides support to explicitly represent recovery tasks i.e. when an error has 
occurred, to describe the set of actions to be performed in order to still reach the 
goal. While this is possible in most task modelling notations (e.g. set of action 
to perform after entering a wrong PIN when using a cash machine) we identify 
here the fact that the notation makes explicit (or not) that this set of task is re-
lated to a user error. 
Table 2. Support for describing errors and errors-related elements 
Task Modelling Notations 
 
 
 
 
Element of representation 
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T
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] 
Id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
h
u
m
an
 e
rr
o
r 
Representation of refined user 
tasks 
No No No No Yes No No No 
Representation of declarative 
knowledge 
No No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Representation of manipu-
lated information 
No No No No Yes No Yes No 
E
x
p
li
ci
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
h
u
m
an
 e
rr
o
r 
Representation of cause and 
observable consequence of 
errors (Genotype, Phenotype) 
No No No No No No No No 
Representation of skill based 
errors (Slips, Lapse) 
No No No No No No No No 
Representation of rule based 
mistakes 
No No No No No No No No 
Representation of knowledge 
based mistakes 
No No No No No No No No 
Explicit representation of error recovery No No No No No No No No 
Even though the table above demonstrates the very limited account of error handling 
in task modeling notation, task models have already been used to take into account 
possible human errors while interacting with an interactive system. Paterno and Santoro 
proposed a model-based technique that uses insertion of deviated human actions into 
task models in order to evaluate the usability of the system and to inform design [28], 
however, such information is presented in tables outside of the task models. This ap-
proach is relevant for human error identification but only in generic terms (as it exploits 
HAZOP which is a standard hazard analysis method). Palanque and Basnyat proposed 
a technique based on task patterns (represented in CTT) that supports human routine 
errors [25] description. Here a specific task model is produced in which recovery ac-
tions following errors are explicitly represented, thus ending up with two un-connected 
task model. Modification in one of the task model has then to be reflected in the other 
one increasing complexity of task modelling activities. In both contributions, no spe-
cific element of the notation are introduced thus leaving the contributions to basic task 
elements provided in CTT notation (and thus not covering errors related to information, 
knowledge … as presented above).  
In order to overcome the limitations of the current task modelling notations, next 
section presents extensions to the HAMSTERS notation to specifically represent errors. 
While the extensions are made explicit on that particular task modelling technique, the 
underlying concepts are generic making them applicable to others.  
3 Extending a Task Modelling Notation to support the 
identification and representation of human errors  
This section presents the extensions that have been added to the HAMSTERS notation 
in order to provide support for systematic identification and representation of human 
errors in task models. We also present how this extended notation has been integrated 
within a human error identification technique. This process starts with an extant task 
model and extends it with explicit genotypes and phenotypes of errors.  
3.1 HAMSTERS notation 
HAMSTERS (Human – centered Assessment and Modeling to Support Task Engi-
neering for Resilient Systems) is a tool-supported graphical task modeling notation for 
representing human activities in a hierarchical and structured way. At the higher ab-
straction level, goals can be decomposed into sub-goals, which can in turn be decom-
posed into activities. Output of this decomposition is a graphical tree of nodes that can 
be tasks or temporal operators. Tasks can be of several types (depicted in Table 3) and 
contain information such as a name, information details, and criticality level. Only the 
single user high-level task types are presented here but they can be further refined. For 
instance the cognitive tasks can be refined in Analysis and Decision tasks [19] and 
collaborative activities can be refined in several task types [17].  
Table 3. Task types in HAMSTERS 
 Abstract Input Output I/O Processing 
Abstract  
Abstract 
Not 
Applicable 
Not 
Applicable 
Not 
Applicable 
Not 
Applicable 
User  
User abstract 
 
Perceptive 
 
Motor 
 
User 
 
Cognitive 
Interactive  
Abstract inter-
active 
 
Input 
 
Output 
 
Input/Output 
Not 
Applicable 
System  
Abstract sys-
tem 
 
Output 
 
Input 
 
Input/Output 
 
System 
Temporal operators (depicted in Table 4 and similar to the ones in CTT) are used to 
represent temporal relationships between sub-goals and between activities. Tasks can 
also be tagged by properties to indicate whether or not they are iterative, optional or 
both. The HAMSTERS notation is supported by a CASE tool for edition and simulation 
of models. This tool has been introduced in order to provide support for task system 
integration at the tool level [17]. This tool supported notation also provides support for 
structuring a large number and complex set of tasks introducing the mechanism of sub-
routines [22], sub-models and components [18]. Such structuring mechanisms allow 
describing large and complex activities by means of task models. These structuring 
mechanisms enables the breakdown of a task model in several ones that can be reused 
in the same or different task models. 
Table 4. Illustration of the operator type within hamsters 
HAMSTERS expressive power goes beyond most other task modeling notations par-
ticularly by providing detailed means for describing data that is required and manipu-
lated [17] in order to accomplish tasks. Fig. 1 summarizes the notation elements to 
represent data. Information (“Inf:” followed by a text box) may be required for execu-
tion of a system task, but it also may be required by the user to accomplish a task. 
Physical objects required for performing a task can also be represented (“Phy O”) as 
well as the device (input and/or output) with which the task is performed (“i/o D”). 
Declarative and situational knowledge can also be made explicit by the “SiK” and 
“StK” elements.  
 
Fig. 1. Representation of Objects, Information and Knowledge with HAMSTERS Notation 
3.2 HAMSTERS notation elements and relationship with genotypes 
All of the above notation elements are required to be able to systematically identify and 
represent human errors within task models. Indeed, some genotypes (i.e. causes of hu-
man errors) can only occur with a specific type of task or with a specific element in a 
task model described using HAMSTERS. This relationship between classification of 
genotypes in human error models and task modelling elements is not trivial. For this 
reason, Table 5 presents the correspondences between HAMSTERS notation elements 
and error genotypes from the GEMS classification [32]. Such a correspondence is very 
useful for identifying potential genotypes on an extant task model.  
It is important to note that strategic and situational knowledge elements are not pre-
sent in this table. Indeed, such constructs are similar to the M (Methods) in GOMS and 
thus correspond to different ways of reaching a goal. As all the methods allow users to 
reach the goal an error cannot be made at that level and is thus not connected to a 
genotype.  
 
Operator type Symbol Description 
Enable T1>>T2 T2 is executed after T1 
Concurrent T1|||T2 T1 and T2 are executed at the same time 
Choice T1[]T2 T1 is executed OR T2 is executed 
Disable T1[>T2 Execution of T2 interrupts the execution of T1 
Suspend-resume T1|>T2 Execution of T2 interrupts the execution of T1, T1 exe-
cution is resumed after T2 
Order Independent T1|=|T2 T1 is executed then T2 OR T2 is executed then T1 
Table 5. Correspondence between HAMSTERS elements and genotypes from GEMS [32] 
Element of notation in 
HAMSTERS 
Related genotype from GEMS [32] 
Perceptive task 
 
Perceptual confusion (Skill Based Error) 
Interference error (Skill Based Error) 
Input task 
 
Motor task 
 
Interference error (Skill Based Error) 
Double capture slip (Skill Based Error) 
Omissions following interruptions (Skill Based Error) 
Cognitive task 
 
Skill based errors ─ Double capture slip 
─ Omissions following interruptions 
─ Reduced intentionality 
─ Interference error 
─ Over-attention errors 
Rule based mistakes Misapplication of good rules 
─ First exceptions 
─ Countersigns and non-signs 
─ Informational overload 
─ Rule strength 
─ General rules 
─ Redundancy 
─ Rigidity 
Application of bad rules 
─ Encoding deficiencies 
─ Action deficiencies 
Knowledge based mis-
takes 
─ Selectivity 
─ Workspace limitations 
─ Out of sight out of mind 
─ Confirmation bias 
─ Overconfidence 
─ Biased reviewing 
─ Illusory correlation 
─ Halo effects 
─ Problems with causality 
─ Problems with complexity 
Information 
 
Double capture slip, Omissions following interruptions, Interference 
error, all of the Rule Based Mistakes and Knowledge Based Mis-
takes 
Declarative knowledge 
 
All of the Knowledge Based Mistakes 
3.3 Extensions to HAMSTERS to describe user errors 
Several notation elements have been added to HAMSTERS in order to allow explicit 
representation of both genotypes and phenotypes of errors. Table 6 summarizes these 
notation elements that can be used to describe an observable consequence of an error 
(phenotype) and its potential associated causes (genotypes). 
In that table the first column lists the types of errors following GEMS classification. 
The second column makes the connection with the SRK classification as previously 
performed in [32]. Third column present the new notation elements in HAMSTERS for 
describing genotypes of errors as well as how they relate to the classifications on human 
error. Four new elements are added: Slips, Lapses, Rule-Based Mistakes and 
Knowledge-Based Mistakes. As for phenotypes only one notation element is proposed. 
Indeed, the phenotype (i.e. how the errors is made visible) only need to be explicitly 
represented, the label beneath it providing a textual description while its relationship to 
Inf : Information
DK : Declarative
the causes is made by connecting genotypes to it. Such connections will be presented 
in details in the case study section.  
Table 6. Representation of genotypes and phenotypes in HAMSTERS 
Type of error 
(GEMS [32]) 
Level of 
Performance from 
[31] 
Representation of 
genotype in 
HAMSTERS 
Representation of 
phenotype in 
HAMSTERS 
Slip 
Skill-based  
 
Lapse 
 
Mistake 
Rule-based 
 
Knowledge-based 
 
3.4 Modelling process 
In this section, we show how we have integrated HAMSTERS extended notation with 
the HET [36] technique. HAMSTERS could be used to replace HTA in any other hu-
man error identification method based on task description, but we have chosen HET 
because it provides a detailed process and because it has been demonstrated in [36] to 
be more accurate than other techniques such as SHERPA and HAZOP [37].  
 
Fig. 2 presents a modified version of the HET process and provides support for iden-
tifying genotypes and phenotypes of possible human errors by embedding error de-
scriptions in the task models that have been produced to describe user activities. The 
extended process starts with a task analysis and description phase (as for the original 
HET one), but in our case the produced task models are refined to represent perceptive, 
cognitive and motor user tasks as well as information and knowledge required to per-
form the tasks. These models take full advantage of the expressive power of 
HAMSTERS that has been presented in section 3. All the modifications made with 
respect to the original process have been made explicit by using various shades of grey.  
Next step in the process exploits the task type–genotypes correspondence table 
(Table 5), to provide support for systematic identification of genotypes associated to 
perceptive, cognitive, motor and interactive input tasks, but also to the related pheno-
types. The likelihood and criticality of a genotype are inserted as properties of the in-
stance of represented genotype. This is performed in HAMSTERS tool by specific 
properties associated to the genotypes icons. Similarly, likelihood and criticality of a 
phenotype can also be described using properties of the instance of a represented phe-
notype. Likelihood of a phenotype may be a combination of likelihood of related gen-
otypes. Once all of the possible genotypes and phenotypes have been identified and 
described in the task model, the human error identification and representation technique 
is applied to the next task model. Once all of the models have been analyzed, a last step 
is performed (see bottom left activity in Fig. 2) in order to determine, for each task 
model that embeds human error descriptions, which phenotypes may be propagated to 
S lip
Lapse
RBM
KBM
other task models. Several phenotypes may be associated to an observable task, but not 
all of them may happen in a particular scenario.  
Start
Hamsters task models including details about:
temporal ordering; refined user task types; 
information, knowledge and objects required
Perform task analysis & modelling
(Refined HTA method using HAMSTERS)
Take the first/next task leaf
Take the first/next related 
genotype
1. Describe the genotype
2. Identify phenotype(s): search for 
the closest sub-goal or related 
observable task on which the 
consequence of the error can be 
observed
3. Describe phenotype
4. Identify and describe likelihood
5. Identify and describe criticality
Are there any other 
associated genotype ?
Are there any other task 
step ?
Task types – 
genotypes 
correspondence 
table (Table 5)
Stop
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Original 
process
Modified 
process
New process
Key
HAMSTERS task 
models 
embedding 
description of 
errors
Is the error credible?
Propagate 
phenotypes to 
other related 
task models
Are there phenotypes that 
should be propagated to 
other related task models ?
No
Yes
Take the first/next task 
model
Are there any other task 
model ?
No
No
 
Fig. 2. Human error identification and description process extended from HET [36] 
4 Illustrative example from an avionics case study 
This section presents an excerpt of task models produced by the application of the pro-
cess presented above for identification and representation to a case study. The case 
study belongs to the aeronautics domain and more precisely deals with pilot tasks ex-
ploiting a weather radar cockpit application. This section aims at illustrating how the 
HAMSTERS extensions can be applied to human operations on a real-life application. 
Due to space constraints, the application of all new elements of notation are not shown 
in this article but most of them are.  
4.1 Presentation of the weather radar case study 
Weather radar (WXR) is an application currently deployed in many cockpits of com-
mercial aircrafts. It provides support to pilots’ activities by increasing their awareness 
of meteorological phenomena during the flight journey, allowing them to determine if 
they may have to request a trajectory change, in order to avoid adverse weather condi-
tions such as storms or precipitations. In this case study, we particularly focus on the 
tasks that have to be performed by a pilot to check the weather conditions on the current 
flight path.  
a) b)  
Fig. 3. Image of a) the numeric part of weather radar control panel b) physical manipulation of 
the range of the weather radar 
Fig. 3 presents a screenshot of the weather radar control panels, used to operate the 
weather radar application. These panels provides two functionalities to the crew. The 
first one is dedicated to the mode selection of weather radar and provides information 
about status of the radar, in order to ensure that the weather radar can be set up correctly. 
The operation of changing from one mode to another can be performed in the upper 
part of the panel (mode selection section).  
 
Fig. 4. Screenshots of weather radar displays 
The second functionality, available in the lower part of the window, is dedicated to 
the adjustment of the weather radar orientation (Tilt angle). This can be done in an 
automatic way or manually (Auto/manual buttons). Additionally, a stabilization func-
tion aims to keep the radar beam stable even in case of turbulences. The right-hand part 
of Fig. 3 (labelled “b)”) presents an image of the controls used to configure radar dis-
play, particularly to set up the range scale (right-hand side knob with ranges 20, 40, … 
nautical miles).  
 
Fig. 5. Task model of the “Check weather conditions on the flight path” task 
Fig. 4 shows screenshots of weather radar displays according to two different range 
scales (40 NM for the left display and 80 NM for the right display). Spots in the middle 
of the images show the current position, importance and size of the clouds. Depending 
on the color of the clouds in the navigation display (Fig. 4), pilots can determine 
whether or not the content of the clouds is dangerous for the aircraft. For example, the 
red color highlights the fact that the clouds contain heavy precipitations. Such infor-
mation is needed in order to ensure that the current or targeted flight plan are safe. 
4.2 Task model of the task “Check weather conditions on the flight path” 
Fig. 5 presents the description, with HAMSTERS elements of notation, of the activities 
that have to be performed to check the weather conditions on the flight path. 
The tasks presented in this model describe how the pilot builds a mental model of the 
current weather from information gathered on the navigation display (Fig. 4). For a 
pilot, checking weather conditions is very important as it provides support for deciding 
to maintain or change the current trajectory of the aircraft. This task is decomposed into 
3 sub tasks: 
· “Examine Map”: the pilot perceives and examines the radar image of the weather, 
which is displayed on the navigation display (see Fig. 4). To perform this analysis, 
the pilot has to know the meaning of the weather representations (described with 
declarative knowledge notation elements in Fig. 5  such as "Green light clouds mean 
precipitation"). 
· “Manage WXR control panel”: This sub task is represented by a subroutine, and 
linked to another task model, which describes the tasks that have to be performed to 
control the WXR modes. 
· “Manage Display Range”: This sub task describes the actions that have to be per-
formed by the pilot in order to change the range of the WXR display with using the 
physical knob “range” (illustrated in Fig. 3 b)). The pilot has to turn the knob to 
modify the range, and then to wait for the radar image to be refreshed on the navi-
gation display (Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 6. Task model of the “check weather conditions on the flight path” task embedding the 
description of potential errors 
 
4.3 Task model with human errors 
Fig. 6 presents a modified version of the “Check weather conditions on the flight path” 
task model. This new version embeds the descriptions of possible human errors (geno-
type and phenotypes) which have been identified while applying the human error iden-
tification process.  
Each human task and interactive input task is connected to one (or several) genotype(s), 
indicating possible cause(s) of errors. Genotypes are then connected to phenotypes, 
which are the observable consequences of the errors. For example, the “Perceive im-
age” perception task is connected to the genotype “Perceptual confusion: image badly 
or not perceived” (zoomed in view in Fig 7). This genotype is also connected to the 
phenotype “Weather target wrongly or not detected”. In the same way, the “Interpret 
and analyze” cognitive analysis task, which requires particular knowledge to be per-
formed (the “DK” labeled rectangles containing declarative knowledge about relation-
ships between the color of visual artefacts in the navigation display and the composition 
of the clouds) is connected to the knowledge based mistake “Illusory correlation: No 
weather problem detected”. This means that a wrong user knowledge association could 
cause a non-detection of a weather issue on the flight path. And this genotype is also 
connected to the phenotype “Weather target wrongly or not detected”.  
 
Fig 7. “Examine map” sub-task of the “check weather conditions on the flight path” task em-
bedding the description of potential errors 
5 Benefits and limitations of the approach 
The stepwise refinement process of task models presented in section 3.4 and its appli-
cation to the case study in section 4 have demonstrated the possibility to exploit the 
extended version of HAMSTERS to support identification and description of operator 
errors on an existing task model.  
Manage WXR control panel
Perceive image Interpret and analyze weather image
>>
Examine map
|=|
Detect weather targets Decide that mental model of current weather has been built
[>
Check weather conditions on the flight path
Obj : 
Inf : About weather on the trajectory of the aircraft
DK : Yellow clouds contain mean precipitations
DK : Red clouds mean heavy precipitations
DK : Green clouds mean light precipitation
Weather target wrongly or not detected
Perceptual confusion :Image badly or not perceived 
Inf : weather image
Illusory correlation : No weather problem detected
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
While this is critical in order to identify parts in a system that might be error prone or 
parts in the system that are not tolerant to operators errors it is also true that the task 
models enriched with error artefacts are gathering a lot of information that might de-
crease their understandability and modifiability. We currently favor the expressiveness 
of the notation and of the resulting task models than legibility and understandability. 
These two aspects are currently being addressed at tool level providing multiple filter-
ing mechanisms for hiding (in a temporary way) information that the analyst is not 
focusing on. For instance, all the information elements can be hidden, as the genotypes 
and the phenotypes if the current activity is to focus on sequencing of tasks.  
The main objective of the approach is to support redesign activities when error prone 
designs have been identified. Such redesign would take place through an iterative de-
sign process involving co-evolution of tasks and systems as presented in [3] but devel-
opment costs are clearly increased. This is the reason why such an approach would be 
also useful for supporting certification activities in critical systems. For instance, as 
stated in [6] CS25-1302 annex E 1-F-1, “Flight deck controls must be installed to allow 
accomplishment of these tasks and information necessary to accomplish these tasks 
must be provided ” and in CS 25-1309 “stems and controls, including indications and 
annunciations must be designed to minimize crew errors, which could create additional 
hazards”. This CS 25 document consists in a list of requirement that have to be fulfilled 
in order for aircraft manufacturers to go successfully through certification processes 
(which are managed by regulatory authorities and/or third parties). The two highlighted 
requirements demonstrate that certification can only be successful using a complete and 
unambiguous description of operator’s tasks and by ensuring that equipment (called 
system in this paper) are not error prone.  
Finally, it is important to note that the process proposed and its associated tool-sup-
ported notation remain a manual expert-based activity. This is made clearly visible by 
the “is the error credible?” step in the process where identification of errors can only 
come from deep understanding of operators activities and possible deviations.  
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented a way of taking into account in a systematic way ab-
normal user behavior by extending previous work in the area of task modelling and 
human error analysis and identification.  
We proposed the use of several classifications in human error and integrated them into 
an analysis and modelling process exploiting new extensions in the task modelling no-
tation HAMSTERS. These extensions make it possible to explicitly represent geno-
types and phenotypes of operator errors and to describe their relationships.  
These contributions have been applied to a real-life case study in the field of aeronautics 
demonstrating most of the aspects of the contributions. However, errors related to stra-
tegic knowledge and errors related to temporal ordering (e.g. the task model describes 
a sequence of tasks but the operator performs them in parallel) were not presented even 
though covered by the approach.  
As identified in “Benefits and Limitations” section, this work targets at supporting cer-
tification activities for critical systems and more precisely cockpits of large aircrafts. 
However, thanks to the tool support provided by HAMSTERS (which make human 
error identification and description less resource consuming) the approach is also ap-
plicable to other domains where errors are damaging, in terms of human life, econom-
ics, prestige, trust … 
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